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Articles 
 
Treason and Terror: A Toxic Brew 
 
B. Mitchell Simpson, III* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Loyalty is the obligation that holds all levels of society 
together. From families and personal relations, to large and 
complex states, loyalty promotes cohesion and stability. The 
classic depiction of loyalty is Socrates’ refusal to flee Athens to 
avoid an unjust death sentence because, as a citizen of Athens, he 
had agreed to obey its laws and therefore, flight would be 
disloyal.1 Betrayal is the opposite of loyalty, and when betrayal is 
applied to states, it is treason.2 Betrayal and its frequent 
companion, violence, have been recurring themes in human affairs 
and remain so to this day. 
States, as well as individuals, have exercised their undoubted 
right to protect themselves against betrayal by creating the 
offense of treason. Treason is an ancient offense, having been first 
 
*    Adjunct Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.   
I am indebeted to my collegaues, Professors Carl Bogus, Edward Eberle, and 
Colleen Murphy, all of Roger Williams Univeristy School of Law, and to 
Professor George Walker, Wake Forest Univeristy School of Law, for their 
encouragement and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
1. PLATO, Crito, in THE WORKS OF PLATO 102–103 (1928). 
2. See DAVID PRYCE-JONES, TREASON OF THE HEART: FROM THOMAS 
PAINE TO KIM PHILBY (2011), for an interesting study of various persons who 
have been disloyal and may have committed treason. See also ERIC FELTEN, 
LOYALTY: THE VEXING VIRTUE (2011), for a more general analysis of loyalty 
and the absence of it. 
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codified in the Anglo-American legal system in 1352.3 More 
recently, it has been strictly defined in the United States 
Constitution.4 The basic concept of treason is to punish a betrayer 
of the larger community, regardless of whether the betrayer be the 
king or the state. Historically, treason has remained constant  
from its codification at the height of the Middle Ages to its 
inclusion in the Constitution, written in 1787, at the height of the 
Enlightenment. In our jurisprudence, its original purpose was to 
punish those who would kill or betray the king. Under the United 
States Constitution, the intention to punish betrayal remains; 
however, it is limited to just two specific acts: levying war against 
the United States or adhering to its enemies by giving them aid 
and comfort.5 
Since gaining its independence in 1776, the United States on 
numerous occasions, has invoked treason, as defined in the 
Constitution, to punish perceived or actual betrayal.6 The 
Continental Congress in 1776 realized that independence required 
treason laws to protect the newly independent states from disloyal 
citizens. The courts have produced a notable body of case law that 
has defined, analyzed, and applied the constitutional definition of 
treason to specific fact patterns. However, most of these cases 
have gone no further than the lower courts. Notedly, it was not 
until 1945 that the Supreme Court reviewed a treason conviction 
for the first time.7 
Historically, the law of treason developed in the context of 
traditional international conflict, which is conflict between 
organized states, usually by traditional armed forces. Treason 
applied to those persons who breached the duty of loyalty owed to 
their own country, by doing something to help an enemy. Recent 
examples include Jane Fonda visiting North Vietnam, and John 
Walker Lindh sojourning in Afghanistan; both of which received 
 
 
3. 4 Halsbury’s Statutes of England 273. However, a more convenient 
source is Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 16 n.22 (1945), in which the 
text of the entire statute is set forth. 
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. 
5. Id. 
6. Associated Press, Past Americans Charged With Treason, FOX NEWS 
(Dec. 17, 2001), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2001/12/17/past-americans- 
charged-with-treason.html. 
7. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 1. 
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much public notoriety as well as accusations of treason.8 Fonda 
espoused the North Vietnamese cause, and visited Hanoi while 
American servicemen (including the future Senator John McCain) 
were imprisoned in the notorious prison camp the “Hanoi Hilton.”9 
Lindh was associated with the Taliban and was captured in 
Afghanistan.10 Although generally unknown to the American 
public, Adam Gadahn appeared in several al Qaeda videos.11 
Did these individuals commit treason? Only  Gadahn  has 
been formally charged with treason by adhering to the enemy and 
giving them aid and comfort.12 Many believe Fonda and Lindh 
should have been tried for treason.13 The justifications for  
refusing to prosecute Fonda and Lindh for treason are complex. 
For instance, one important factor was that the facts might not 
support convictions. Another likely reason Fonda was not charged 
with treason was the unruly domestic divisiveness caused by the 
Vietnam War. Lindh was charged with numerous other offenses 
and ultimately pled guilty to only two counts.14 Lindh is currently 
serving a twenty-year sentence.15 
However, today there is a new form of conflict mostly waged 
by small groups of non-state actors working in the shadows of 
 
 
 
8. Colby Itkowitz, How Jane Fonda’s 1972 trip to North Vietnam earned 
her the nickname ‘Hanoi Jane,’ THE WASH. POST (Sept. 18 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/09/18/how-jane- 
fondas-1972-trip-to-north-vietnam-earned-her-the-nickname-hanoi-jane/ 
?utm_term=.dfd8f13a16fc; Paul Theroux, Pardon the American Taliban, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/opinion/ 
sunday/pardon-the-american-taliban.html?mcubz=0. 
9. HENRY MARK HOLZER & ERIKA HOLZER, AID AND COMFORT: JANE 
FONDA IN NORTH VIETNAM 1 (2002). 
10. Theroux, supra note 8. 
11. Adam Gadahn Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 17, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/23/us/adam-gadahn-fast-facts/index.html. 
12. First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Gadahn, SA CR 05- 
254(A) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006), available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/opa/ 
documents/adam_indictment.pdf [hereinafter Gadahn Indictment]. 
13. Itkowitz, supra note 8; Theroux, supra note 8. For the purposes of 
this article, the Fonda and Lindh cases are illustrative of the passions they 
have aroused. 
14. Neil A. Lewis, American Who Joined Taliban Pleads Guilty, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jul. 15, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/15/national/american- 
who-joined-taliban-pleads-guilty.html?mcubz=0. 
15. See infra note 304 and accompanying text. 
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modern society, both at home and abroad.16 The American 
response has been dubbed “the war against terror” both on foreign 
soil and within the United States. Small groups of individuals 
attacked the United States abroad by bombing the embassy in 
Kenya17 and the USS Cole in Yemen,18 and also killed almost 
three-thousand people in attacks on New York City and the 
Pentagon on September 11, 2001.19 
The continuing threat to the United States from such groups 
is real and dangerous. Public security is rightly a major concern  
in contemporary America. The possibility still remains that an 
attack could occur in the United States, such as a suicide attack 
by a small group of individuals. There are many statutes in effect 
that provide important legal weapons in the war against 
terrorism.20 These statutes provide criminal penalties for a  
variety of acts that may be committed by anyone, regardless of 
whether that person owes a duty of loyalty to the United States.21 
However, the treason statute is unique.22 It only applies to 
persons who owe a duty of loyalty to the United States, and thus 
the treason statute applies to the so-called “homegrown 
terrorists.”23 The statute defines treason as a breach of loyalty; 
only criminalizing levying war against the United States or 
 
16. Sam Finegold & Gina Kim, Treason in the War on Terror, HARVARD 
POLITICAL REVIEW (Dec. 7, 2011, 10:02 PM), http://harvardpolitics.com/covers/ 
constitution/treason-in-the-war-on-terror/. 
17. Rescuers search for life in rubble of Nairobi bomb attack, CNN (Aug. 
8, 1998, 2:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9808/07/africa. 
explosions.04/. 
18. Raphael Perl & Ronald O’Rourke, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: 
Background and Issues for Congress, NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND 
(Jan. 30, 2001), https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading- 
room/title-list-alphabetically/t/terrorist-attack-on-uss-cole-background-and- 
issues-for-congress.html. On October 12, 2000, suicide terrorists attacked the 
USS Cole with a small boat of explosives in Yemen. Id. 
19. Peter L. Bergen, September 11 attacks, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/September-11-attacks (last visited Sept. 9, 
2017). 
20. In addition to the Treason statute (18 U.S.C. § 2381), there are two 
broad statutes, Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (18 U.S.C. § 2332a), and 
Acts of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries (18 U.S.C. § 2332b), 
which cover a wide variety of proscribed acts. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2381, 2332a, 
2332b (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-51). 
21. Id. § 2332a (Westlaw); § 2332b (Westlaw). 
22. Id. § 2381 (Westlaw). 
23. See id. 
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adhering to its enemies by rendering them aid and comfort.24 The 
Constitution, and the treason statute under it, have provided the 
union with a powerful weapon to protect itself and to punish 
wrongdoers. 
In the twenty-first century, treason is an appropriate legal 
weapon in the war against domestic terrorism. For example, a 
small group of American citizens or residents could plan and 
execute an attack against one or more soft targets, the effects of 
which could be significant, even if they are not as devastating as 
the attacks on September 11th. Depending on the attackers’ 
intent, they could be tried for treason. 
In an attempt to provide a greater insight as to why a treason 
charge would be appropriate in these new situations, Part I of this 
Article will explain why treason is the greatest of all crimes, and 
then examine the law of treason as it has developed and been 
applied under the Constitution. Part II of this Article will discuss 
the treason clause in the Constitution and its origins. Part III will 
discuss the early American experience with treason trials under 
the Constitution, mostly involving questions of levying war 
against the United States. Part IV examines the second prong of 
treason—adhering to the enemy by giving aid and comfort—and 
how courts have dealt with this in the twentieth century. Finally, 
Part V will conclude that, under the appropriate circumstances, 
acts of terror committed against the United States by citizens or 
non-citizen residents constitute treason as defined in the 
Constitution. 
I. TREASON: THE GREATEST OF ALL CRIMES 
Treason is a crime of betrayal on the grandest scale possible, 
worse than any other major felony, such as murder or arson. It 
has no individual victims because it is a crime against all 
members of the state. Treason “imports a betraying, treachery, or 
breach of faith.”25 It requires both an act and an intent, which 
may be inferred from the act itself. Our constitutional definition  
of treason is directly derived from its first codification in 1352 in 
 
24. See id. 
25. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 75 
(facsimile of the first edition of 1765–1769, London & Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1979) (1769). 
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the statute of 25 Edward III.26 At that time, under the feudal 
order, there was no state in the modern sense. This medieval 
statute only proscribed acts that constituted a breach of faith 
(loyalty) by a lord or other vassal against the king because the 
king was at the apex of the feudal order.27 These acts included 
both levying war against the king and compassing his death. As 
society developed and political currents shifted, so too did the 
concept of treason as a breach of faith, not of the king, but of an 
impersonal or abstract conception of the state.28 The legal 
rationale of the Roundheads to try King Charles I for treason in 
1649 was based on this shift in the concept of treason. 
The original hierarchical feudal society was gradually 
replaced by a complex, diversified mercantile society, in which 
states were based on national lines, although kings were usually 
the rulers. When the American colonies achieved their 
independence from the British Crown in 1776, they needed a 
unifying theory to replace their former allegiance to King George 
III. Fortunately, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
articulated such a theory in the form of a social contract. In 1680, 
Robert Filmer claimed that political sovereignty originated with 
God and was transmitted by primogeniture through succeeding 
generations. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 put an end to such 
notions; yet, there was still no systematic explanation as to why 
humans formed civil society until 1690 when John Locke 
published his TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.29 Essentially, 
Locke held that humans voluntarily consented with others to 
“make one body politic,” and by doing so, put themselves “under 
an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the 
determination of the majority.”30 Locke’s concept of a social 
contract as the foundation of civil society was in tune with the 
prevailing political notions then prevalent in England. His ideas 
 
 
26. 4 Halsbury’s Statutes of England 273. 
27. See id. 
28. D. ALAN ORR, TREASON AND THE STATE: LAW, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY 
IN THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR (2002). The complex politics of the English Civil 
War aside, Orr’s explanation of the underlying and shifting ideological and 
legal concepts is both comprehensive and masterful. See id. 
29. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT (Ernest Rhys ed., J.M. 
Dent & Sons, Ltd. last rprt. 1943) (1690). 
30. Id. at 165. 
 2018] TREASON AND TERROR 7 
were also extremely influential in the American Revolution and 
later in the Constitutional Convention of 1787.31 
The United States Constitution expresses the concept of a 
social contract in its Preamble with the opening phrase, “We the 
People . . . .”32 This phrase unequivocally states that the people, 
that is, American society at large, created the federal government 
for certain specified purposes. One purpose is to establish justice; 
that is, to secure the rights of the people by a judicial system to 
settle disputes. These rights include personal rights and the right 
to hold property.33 In this way, the Constitution is an expression 
of the abstract social concept as reduced to written form for the 
sole purpose of establishing an organic, fundamental law for the 
governance of the United States. Today, this has transcended into 
a modern state or body politic wholly divorced from a ruling 
monarch and rests on the consent of the governed. For  this 
reason, a betrayal of the United States by an act of treason is 
tantamount to a betrayal of all the people, because it threatens 
 
31. The concept of humans living in a state of nature and then coming 
together to form a civil society was not original for Locke. He was indebted to 
RICHARD HOOKER’S LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY (1594) for the notions of a 
state of nature and the formation of civil society. Locke was by no means the 
only person who wrote about the social contract in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Thomas Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Samuel von 
Pufendorf and many others contributed variations on this theme. The 
Founding Fathers in 1787 were well-educated men who were keenly aware of 
those various intellectual currents. Of the fifty-five delegates to the 1787 
Constitutional Convention, twenty-nine held undergraduate degrees, twelve 
had done some form of postgraduate study, six had completed their law 
studies at London’s Inns of Court and three held degrees from Oxford, St. 
Andrews and Glasgow Universities. RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: 
THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 65–66 (2009). TREVOR 
COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE: WHIG HISTORY AND THE INTELLECTUAL 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Liberty Fund 1998) (1965) has 
catalogued the contents of their libraries. For a discussion of  how  
rationalism and the Enlightenment relate to natural law see HEINRICH A. 
ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY AND 
PHILOSOPHY 67–96 (Thomas R. Hanley trans., Liberty Fund 1998) (1936). 
32. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
33. The entire Preamble reads, “WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, 
in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic 
tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, 
and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain 
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” Id.  See 
also NICHOLAS PHILLIPSON, ADAM SMITH: AN ENLIGHTENED LIFE 110 (2010), for 
Adam Smith’s unpublished Edinburgh lectures on jurisprudence. 
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their security. James Wilson, the presumed author of the 
Constitution’s treason clause, described treason in a law lecture in 
1790 as “unquestionably [the] crime most dangerous to the  
society, and most repugnant to the first principles of the social 
compact.”34 Justice Bradley succinctly said, “[n]o crime is greater 
than treason.”35 Simply put, “[a] traitor’s offense is that he 
conspires against the liberty of his fellow countrymen to choose 
their way of life.”36 
To constitute treason under the Constitution, an act does not 
need to be performed in furtherance of the interests of another 
state.37 Rather, all that is required is that the act amount to a  
levy of war against the United States or an adherence to its 
enemies by giving them aid and comfort.38 The Constitution 
focuses on the act itself, and is not concerned with whether or not 
the act is designed to further the interests of a foreign state.39   
The first treason cases under the Constitution did not involve 
foreign states, but they did involve armed resistance to the 
authority of the federal government, which was construed as 
levying war against the United States.40 Prosecutions for treason, 
therefore, are a matter of justified self-preservation for the United 
States, that is the body politic or the state identified by the phrase 
 
34. James Wilson (1742–1798), a member of the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787, made this statement in his law lecture “Of Crimes 
Against the Community.” 2 JAMES WILSON, Of Crimes, Immediately Against 
the Community, in COLLECTED  WORKS  OF  JAMES  WILSON  1149, 1149 (Kermit 
L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2007). Wilson was one of 
six men who signed both the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution. President Washington appointed him to the first United States 
Supreme Court. James Willard Hurst strongly suggests that Wilson, as a 
member of the Committee of Detail, was the most likely the author of the 
treason clause. See Willard Hurst, Treason in the United States: The 
Constitution, 58 HARV. L. REV. 395, 404–05 (1945). 
35. Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. 342, 347 (1870). 
36. REBECCA WEST, THE NEW MEANING OF TREASON 370 (1964). 
37. See Captain Jabez W. Loane, IV, Treason and Aiding the Enemy, 30 
MIL. L. REV. 43, 57–58 (1965). 
38. The U.S. Constitution defines treason as: “Treason against the 
United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering 
to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted 
of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, 
or on Confession in open Court.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
39. See Loane, supra note 37, at 58. 
40. See United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346 (1795); United States 
v. Fries, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 515 (1799). 
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“We the People” and created by the Constitution.41 For these 
reasons, acts involving levying war or adhering to national 
enemies, which rise to the level of treason under the Constitution, 
properly remain crimes punishable as treason, even in the twenty- 
first century, although contemporary circumstances were hardly 
contemplated by the Founding Fathers. 
In World War II, the enemies of the United States were other 
states and were clearly identified by formal declarations of war. 
Germany and Japan levied war against the United States with 
forces armed and arrayed in a military manner. During the Cold 
War, the identified enemy was another state, the Soviet Union, 
although there was no formal declaration of war, or even a direct 
military conflict. There were numerous indictments of treason 
during World War II, but no one was indicted for treason as a 
result of aiding the Soviet Union, not even the Rosenbergs who 
spied for the Russians during wartime, even though the court 
referred to them as traitors. They were tried, convicted, and 
executed under the Espionage Act.42 
So far in the twenty-first century conflict has been markedly 
different. The so-called “war against terror” has been waged 
against the United States not by a state but by non-state actors, 
whose forces are seldom armed and arrayed in a traditional 
military manner. The “enemy” has been small groups of men, 
women and even children, who have detonated bombs in crowded 
areas abroad or have attempted or actually committed other acts 
of violence at home.43 Indeed, the “enemy” may be anyone, 
 
41. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
42. See United States v. Rosenberg, 109 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D.N.Y.), 
aff’d, 204 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1953). On a motion for reduced death sentences, 
the defendants, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, sought judicial review of their 
convictions. Id. The Rosenbergs were dedicated communist spies  who,  
during World War II, turned over documents and other information relating 
to nuclear weapons to the Soviet Union. See id. The trial court referred 
obliquely to the social contract, “[t]he murderer kills only his victim while the 
traitor violates all the members of his society, all the members of the group to 
which he owes his allegiance.” Id. Prior to this motion, the Rosenbergs’ 
convictions were consistently upheld. See United States v. Rosenberg, 195 
F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838, and rehearing denied, 344 U.S. 
889 (1952). See also Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945), which was 
the leading treason case during World War II. 
43. See, e.g., Bryan Denson, FBI thwarts terrorist bombing attempt at 
Portland holiday tree lighting, authorities say, OREGONLIVE (Nov. 29, 2010, 
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including residents and even citizens of the United States. At 
home the “enemy” frequently has remained quiet, and has been 
covert until some form of action has been taken, thus making 
difficult their identification before they have acted.  These 
changed circumstances have led to extensive legislation that 
applies to acts which may be motivated by a treasonous intent,  
but do not fall within the Constitutional definition of treason.44 
Do these changed circumstances and the enactment of new 
legislation mean that treason is now an outmoded legal concept, 
and that other statutes have superseded treason as an  
appropriate legal weapon?45 On the contrary, if a person owing 
allegiance to the United States because he or she is a citizen or a 
non-citizen resident commits an act falling within the 
constitutional definition of treason, that person has committed 
treason, regardless of whether or not other charges could be 
preferred. The reason is clear: that person has breached the 
underlying social contract. Whether or not the Attorney General 
seeks an indictment for treason is within his or her discretion, and 
will depend on a plethora of other factors, including, but not 
limited to political if not electoral considerations. But the fact 
remains that treason, as defined in the Constitution, remains a 
violation of the social contract, and the perpetrator should be 
charged with treason, along with any other appropriate charges.46 
 
 
1:07 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2010/11/fbi_thwarts_ 
terrorist_bombing.html. 
44. Chapter 115 of Title 18 of the United States Code not only contains 
the treason statute (§ 2381), but also misprision of treason (§ 2382), rebellion 
or insurrection (§ 2383), seditious conspiracy (§ 2384) and advocating 
overthrow of government (§ 2385). 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2381–2385 (Westlaw 
through Pub. L. No. 115-51). Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a applies to the 
use of weapons of mass destruction, specifically, against a national of the 
United States, or within the United States, and § 2332b applies to acts of 
terrorism transcending national boundaries. Id. § 2332a–2332b. The 
defendants in the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 were convicted of 
seditious conspiracy, a violation of § 2384. Id. § 2384. The convictions were 
affirmed in United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 160 (2d Cir. 1999). 
45. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence About Treason, 82 N.C. L. 
REV. 1611 (2004) (arguing that treason is indeed an outmoded concept). See 
Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treason in the Age of Terrorism: An Explanation and 
Evaluation of Treason’s Return in Democratic States, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 1443 (2009), for a capable and compelling refutation. 
46. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
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II. THE TREASON CLAUSE AND ITS ORIGINS 
It is no accident that treason is the only crime defined in the 
Constitution, and that it is strictly defined.47 The Founders were 
aware of the English experience, and they had two objectives in 
mind. First, they defined treason strictly by limiting it to only two 
specific acts of betrayal: levying war against the United States 
and adhering to its enemies by giving them aid and comfort.48 
Secondly, by strictly defining treason in the Constitution, they 
prevented Congress and the courts from expanding its definition 
either by legislation or by judicial interpretation.49 
The Continental Congress was concerned with treason even 
before independence was declared in 1776. In June of that year, a 
month before American Independence was declared, the thirteen 
American colonies were at least nominally part of the British 
Empire, and George III was still their king. However, in that 
month the Continental Congress, in anticipation of independence, 
recognized that popular support would be necessary to the long- 
term survival of the independent colonies. Congress was keenly 
aware that many residents opposed independence, and that these 
people would remain loyal to the Crown. These loyalists could  
pose a threat to American independence. 
Congress appointed a committee to look into assuring the 
colonists’ allegiance to the soon-to-be independent colonies.50 This 
 
47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 is very specific: “Treason against the 
United States shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering 
to their enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted 
of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, 
or on Confession in open Court.” Id. In § 3, cl. 2, the Founders authorized 
Congress to prescribe the punishment for treason, but specifically limited the 
punishment of corruption of blood to the life of the defendant. Also, U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 deprives Congress of the power to enact a bill of 
attainder. Both of these constitutional provisions are significant and 
deliberate departures from the English law. Later in 1791, U.S. CONST. 
amend. VIII forbid “cruel and unusual punishment,” presumably a rejection 
of the English punishment of hanging, drawing, and quartering traitors. 
48. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
49. See id. 
50. See James Willard Hurst, Treason in the United States: I. Treason 
Down to the Constitution, 58 HARV. L. REV. 226, 247 (1944). This article is  
the first of a series of three articles that comprise an authoritative, if not 
magisterial, review and analysis of the law of treason in the United States 
from the earliest settlements to 1944. They were later collected and 
 12 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1 
 
committee included James Wilson, John Adams, Thomas 
Jefferson, John Rutledge, and Robert Livingston, who reported 
back to Congress even before the Declaration of Independence was 
signed. Their report acknowledged the imminent creation of new 
political entities and urged the states to enact laws providing for 
the punishment of treason, that is disloyalty to the soon to be 
independent states. The Continental Congress adopted it on June 
24, 1776. 
The resolution adopting the report echoed the Statute of 25 
Edward III, which was well known to the committee, and 
contained the traditional elements of treason.51 First, it recited 
the reciprocal duties of individuals and then stated, “all persons 
abiding within any of the United Colonies, and deriving protection 
from the laws of the same, owe allegiance to the said laws.”52 It 
continued by specifying the two major acts of treason later 
embodied in the Constitution: “all persons, . . . owing allegiance to 
any of the United Colonies, . . . who shall levy war against” any of 
them “or be adherent to the king of Great Britain, or others the 
enemies of the said colonies, . . . are guilty of treason against such 
colony.”53 
Six months after independence, Pennsylvania enacted a 
comprehensive treason statute on February 11, 1777.54 This 
statute is important because it illustrates the then prevailing 
concept of treason, most of which was deliberately omitted from 
the Constitutional definition drafted in 1787.55 The  statute 
minces no words. The preamble recognizes the Tory threat to the 
newly independent state of Pennsylvania and recites the necessity 
“for the safety of every state to prevent . . . treasonable and 
dangerous practices” by “internal enemies.”56 The purpose of the 
statute was deterrence of “all persons from the perpetration of 
 
published as THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES in 1971 by the 
Greenwood Publishing Company. 
51. Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, c. 2 (Eng.). 
52. 5 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 475 
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1906) (1776). 
53. Id. 
54. Law of Feb. 11, 1777, ch. DCCXL, 1777 Penn. Laws 45 (repealed 
1860). 
55. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
56. Law of Feb. 11, 1777, ch. DCCXL, § I, 1777 Penn. Laws 45, 45 
(repealed 1860). 
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such horrid and dangerous crimes.”57 
Its scope was broad and inclusive. It applied to everyone “now 
inhabiting, residing or sojourning” in Pennsylvania, and to 
everyone in the future who voluntarily comes into the state to 
“inhabit, reside or sojourn.”58 The statute with the concept that it 
was the state’s duty to provide protection to persons within the 
state, whether or not they were citizens, and the reciprocal duty of 
those persons to refrain from betraying the state by committing 
certain specified acts, was firmly grounded in what was generally 
understood to be the law of treason.59 
The Pennsylvania statute proscribed six categories of overt 
acts: (1) accepting “commissions from the King of Great Britain,” 
or other enemies; (2) “levy[ing] war against the state or 
government”; (3) providing “aid or assistance” to “any enemies at 
open war against this state, or the United States of America”; (4) 
“carrying on a traitorous correspondence with them”; (5) forming a 
“conspiracy for betraying this state or the United States of 
America”; and (6) “giv[ing] or send[ing] any intelligence to the 
enemies of this state for that purpose.”60 
The statute included a procedural safeguard by specifically 
requiring “two sufficient witnesses” for a conviction, but it was 
silent as to whether these two witnesses must testify to the same 
overt act.61 Conviction carried with it the death penalty and a 
forfeiture of the traitor’s estate to the commonwealth. However, 
the trial judges could modify the forfeiture to provide for the 
support of the traitor’s wife and children.62 
 
57. Id. 
58. Id. § II. 
59. At the time of the Constitutional Convention a widely read and 
leading authority on criminal law was Sir Matthew Hale’s History of the 
Pleas of the Crown. MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE 
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 59–100 (London, In the Savory: Printed 
by E. and R. Nutt, and R. Gosling for  F.  Gyles,  T.  Woodward,  and  C.  
Davis 1736). James Wilson and the other lawyers in the convention as well  
as many educated persons were familiar with it and by inference with the 
discussion of treason. I am grateful to the staff of the Redwood Library and 
Athenaeum in Newport for access to the 1736 edition of this work, which is 
part of its original collection. 
60. Law of Feb. 11, 1777, ch. DCCXL, § III, 1777 Penn. Laws 45, 45–46 
(repealed 1860). 
61. Id. at 46. 
62. Id. 
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It was not long before the Pennsylvania treason statute was 
enforced with a vengeance. The British had occupied Philadelphia 
in late 1777, a few months after the statute had been enacted, and 
remained there until June 1778.63 After the British left 
Philadelphia, it was time to confront all those persons who were 
even remotely suspected of cooperating with the British occupiers. 
Quakers were particularly suspect because of their refusal on 
religious grounds to bear arms for either side. In addition, a 
radical party was in control of the state, and brought numerous 
treason charges against their real or supposed enemies with a 
great deal of relish. 
James Wilson64 defended twenty-three men who were  
charged with treason, twenty-one of whom were acquitted.65 Only 
Abraham Carlisle66 and John Roberts67 were convicted and soon 
afterwards were hanged.68 
Carlisle was an elderly and prosperous carpenter. He was  
also a Quaker. During the British occupation he had served in 
some capacity at a gate to the city. At the very least, he had been  
a civilian employee of the British. However, he was charged with 
taking a commission from the British. Despite Wilson’s best 
efforts in pointing out that no commission was ever proven, 
Carlisle was nevertheless convicted of taking a commission from 
the British. 
John Roberts, like Carlisle, was also a Quaker. He was a 
miller in Lower Merion and father of nine children. The state’s 
witnesses generally testified to Roberts’ sympathies for the British 
 
63. Id. at 47. Note that this was approximately the same time that 
General Washington and the Continental Army wintered at Valley Forge. 
64. Robert Aitken, James Wilson: A Lost American Founder, 29 LITIG. 
61, 61–62, 64 (Summer 2003). Wilson was born in Scotland and emigrated to 
Pennsylvania in 1763. He read law under John Dickinson and later became 
an eminent Philadelphia lawyer. By this time, he was well known in 
Philadelphia, not only as an extremely competent lawyer, but also as having 
little sympathy with the radical party that controlled Pennsylvania, and 
particularly Philadelphia. Id. 
65. Id. at 64. 
66. Respublica v. Abraham Carlisle, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 35 (1778). 
67. Respublica v. John Roberts, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 39 (1778). 
68. The account of the Carlisle and Roberts trials is based on both the 
reported cases and CHARLES PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER, 
1742–1798, at 117–122 (1956), a good biography with an excellent account of 
the Philadelphia treason trials of 1778. 
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and his oral statements to that effect. The state sought to 
introduce Roberts’ “confession.” Wilson strenuously objected on 
grounds that a Pennsylvania statute specifically forbade the use of 
a confession as evidence in such matters. He was overruled, and 
Roberts was convicted. Death by hanging and forfeiture of his 
property were the penalties. 
The judges and the juries at the trials of Carlisle and Roberts 
performed their respective duties under the law. Remarkably, 
both the judges and the jurors pleaded for clemency for both men 
in petitions to the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, 
which alone had the power to commute the sentences.69 More  
than 1,500 other people in Philadelphia and its environs signed 
numerous other petitions for clemency.70 The blood lust of a 
significant portion of the populace could only be satisfied by 
hanging Carlisle and Roberts. Presumably, political expediency 
explains the denial of these petitions. This realization may also 
explain why later juries acquitted all remaining defendants.71 
The Carlisle and Roberts trials are no longer remembered. 
But what must have been a searing experience made a lasting 
impression on James Wilson. Nine years later, in 1787, he had  
the opportunity as a member of the Constitutional Convention to 
influence the definition of treason, the only crime set forth in the 
Constitution.72 He was well aware of the extraordinary passions 
that could be aroused by just the suspicion of treason; he had seen 
what happened with the introduction of Robert’s out of court 
confession; he knew the breadth of the Pennsylvania statute, and 
the imprecision of its language. Even so, there would always be 
threats from one source or another, and citizens and residents 
could be tempted to betray the country. The question was how 
much restraint was required to satisfy the justifiable need for 
 
 
69. Id. at 122. 
70. 7 SAMUEL HAZARD, PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES, 26–37 (1853). 
71. See Carlton F.W. Larson, The Revolutionary American Jury: A Case 
Study of the 1778–1779 Philadelphia Treason Trials, 61 SMU L. REV. 1441, 
1493, 1496–97 (2008). The juries were faced with a cruel dilemma.  Under  
the law, they could either acquit or convict; there was no lesser offense. If 
they convicted, a pardon was not likely as the Carlisle and Roberts cases 
showed. This may be one explanation for the remaining acquittals. 
72. Wilson is widely believed to be the author of this provision. See 
Hurst, supra note 34, at 404. 
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security. The events in Philadelphia, in the autumn of 1778, led 
Wilson to his views on the law of treason, which were later 
embodied in the Constitution, and which he explained in his law 
lectures. 
In his famous law lectures of 1790, James Wilson provided an 
early explanation of why treason was strictly defined in the 
Constitution: “Treason against the United States, shall consist 
only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, 
giving them Aid and Comfort.”73 In addition to the strict  
definition of treason, the Constitution includes the procedural 
safeguards of requiring two witnesses to the same overt act and 
excluding out of court confessions.74 Wilson and other members of 
the convention were acutely aware of the English experience with 
the use and abuse of treason. For example, he noted that in the 
reign of Henry VIII the “malignant spirit of inventing treasons 
revived” and produced the absurd result that the king’s physicians 
refused to inform their patient that his condition was terminal, 
lest they be charged with treason for predicting the king’s death.75 
By defining treason in the Constitution, both Congress and the 
courts were precluded from “inventing” new treasons. 
In these law lectures, Wilson drew on the experience of 
several centuries of English history and established two criteria 
for the law of treason: it should be “determinate” and it should be 
“stable.”76 These criteria were necessary to avoid the abusive use 
of treason that had occurred in England, and which were well 
known to the drafters of the Constitution. The prime example is 
the treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603, which was based 
on insufficient evidence at best. The real motivation behind the 
trial was political intrigue at the court of James I.77 
 
 
73. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
74. Id. 
75. WILSON, supra note 34, at 1151. 
76. Id. at 1149. The lectures were given at the College of Philadelphia 
(later the University of Pennsylvania) to a distinguished audience, which 
included the President, Mrs. Washington and Vice-President John Adams, 
among other luminaries. Larson, supra note 71, at 1442. The University of 
Pennsylvania School of Law traces its origin to these lectures and claims 
Wilson as its founder. 
77. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE 
AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE, 1552–1634, at 190–217 (Little, Brown & Co. 
1990) (1957), for a scholarly, but exceptionally well-written account of the 
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The constitutional definition of treason is determinate 
because it clearly specifies that it “shall consist only in levying 
War” or “in adhering to their Enemies” and nothing else.78 It is 
also stable because it is defined in the Constitution, and for that 
reason Congress lacks the power to define it. As  Wilson  
explained, the citizens are “secured effectually from even 
legislative tyranny.”79 Even though the Constitution prevents 
Congress from expanding the definition of treason by labeling 
other acts as treason, Congress may decide that other acts that 
could have been reasonably considered treasonous are felonies, 
and provide severe penalties for committing them.80 
A strict definition of treason is not a modern idea. It was 
embodied in the treason statute of 1352, generally known as the 
Statute of 25 Edward III.81 This statute was remedial.82 No  
longer could acts which otherwise were legitimate political dissent 
be treason. It clearly stated what acts constituted treason in the 
context of a medieval society.83 Only those acts specifically 
enumerated in the statute were treasonous.84 Even though it was 
enacted under conditions very different from those found in 
succeeding generations, this statute is the generally accepted 
bedrock of the law of treason. Its basic concept of enforcing loyalty 
to the king has been transferred easily to the American republic. 
Indeed, the phrase “levying war” in the Constitution was taken 
directly from this statute.85 
After defining specific acts of treason, the statute provided 
 
trial. 
78. U.S. CONST. art III, § 3, cl.1. 
79. WILSON, supra note 34, at 1152. 
80. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945). 
81. See id. at 16 & n.22. The statute is fundamental to the English and 
later American law of treason. In the seventeenth century, Sir Edward Coke 
started his discussion of treason in the Third Part of the Institutes. 2 SIR 
EDWARD COKE, The Third Part of the Institutes: Cap. I. Of High Treason, 
reprinted in THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 952 
(Steve Sheppard ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2003). In the twentieth century, Sir 
William Holdsworth discussed it and its application in A History of English 
Law. 3 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 287–293 
(Methuen & Co. Ltd. 3d ed. 1923). 
82. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 81, at 287. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 291. 
85. U.S. CONST. art III, §3, cl. 1. 
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that if a fact pattern of presumed treason arises, the judge hearing 
the matter “shall not go to judgment in such cases; but shall tarry” 
until the king or parliament determines whether or not it should 
be considered treason or another felony.86 This provision was an 
early attempt at strict construction of the statute so as to limit the 
number of acts that would be treasonous. It did not succeed. 
English law is replete with examples of constructive treasons, 
which expanded the scope of the offense significantly by judicial 
decision.87 The Constitutional definition four and a half centuries 
later is a more recent and a more successful limitation.88 Unlike 
the Statute of 25 Edward III, the Constitution also includes the 
procedural safeguards of two witnesses to the same overt act, and 
excludes out of court confessions, thus making prosecution of 
treason more difficult than prosecution for other criminal acts.89 
The Statute of 25 Edward III was based on the notion that 
treason is a betrayal of the duty of loyalty a person owes to his 
sovereign king.90 Historically, the sovereign was the king, but in 
republics, the sovereign is the political entity of a country.  
Clearly, citizens may commit treason against their sovereign, 
whoever or whatever it may be. There is a reciprocal relationship 
between the sovereign who provides protection to the citizen, and 
to the non-citizen resident alike, in exchange for a degree of 
loyalty, or at least the absence of betrayal in the form of outright 
rebellion or subversion. For this reason, Wilson concludes that an 
alien or a non-citizen may commit treason in the country in which 
he resides, as well as citizens of that country.91 
In explaining “levying war” Wilson warms to his subject by 
describing it as persons “arrayed in a warlike manner,” and 
specifying an assembly “in great numbers, armed with offensive 
weapons, or weapons of war, if they march thus armed in a body” 
with commanders or officers, and “with banners displayed, or with 
 
 
86. WILSON, supra note 34, at 1150. 
87. 8 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 307–322 
(Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1925). 
88. U.S. CONST. art III, § 3, cl. 1. 
89. See id. 
90. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 81, at 287. 
91. WILSON, supra note 34, at 1153. The point appears to be well settled. 
See Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154 (1872); United 
States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 97 (1820). 
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drums or trumpets.”92  The important point is that the assembly  
of persons must be organized for war, not that war must be 
actually waged. Wilson describes levying war in the manner of  
the eighteenth century: “arrayed in a warlike manner.”93 
However, he only alluded to the necessity of a treasonous intent of 
the principals, which by definition, and later court decisions, is 
required to levy war against the United States. 
Unfortunately, Wilson devotes scant attention to the other 
prong of treason—adhering to the enemy. He explains this phrase 
with the constitutional words “giving them aid and comfort” which 
apparently ends the discussion as far as he is concerned.94 
However, he does provide a few classic examples, such as giving 
intelligence, sending provisions and selling arms “to enemies of 
the United States.”95 All of these examples involve  providing 
some form of aid or comfort to an enemy and thus they follow the 
constitutional definition.96 His analysis is spotty, presumably 
because he considered the means of providing “aid and comfort” to 
be self-explanatory.97 
Wilson’s analysis identifies who may commit treason and 
explains the meaning of the phrases “levying war” and “adhering 
to enemies.”98 Anyone who has enjoyed the protection of the 
United States can commit treason because there are reciprocal 
duties of the nation to protect its citizens and lawful residents, 
and of those same people, to refrain from levying war against the 
United States or adhering to her enemies.99 
Wilson’s description of treason is simple and by today’s 
standards it could be called simplistic. But, his lecture was not 
intended to be a detailed analysis of treason. Nevertheless, it is 
accurate as far as it goes, and in that sense, he succeeded 
admirably. However, any chance to apply Wilson’s analysis would 
have to wait for later judicial decisions in specific instances. 
 
 
92. WILSON, supra note 34, at 1153–54. 
93. Id. at 1153. 
94. Id. at 1155. 
95. Id. 
96. WILSON, supra note 34, at 1155. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 1153. 
99. Id.; see Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154 (1872); 
see United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 97 (1820). 
 20 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1 
 
Early decisions were presented with the factual question of 
what precisely constitutes “levying war.” Later in the twentieth 
century, courts were concerned with what is required to render 
“aid and comfort” to an enemy. Regardless of the factual  
questions of the case, all treason cases were concerned with intent 
one way or the other, because if there was no treasonous intent, 
there was no treason despite the consequences of a particular 
act.100 In 1795, the new federal government was faced with an 
insurrection. Was it treason? 
III. THE FIRST CHALLENGES: LEVYING WAR 
The first treason cases under the new Constitution did not 
involve betrayal to foreign powers. Instead, they involved  
domestic quasi-military opposition to acts of Congress. These 
cases were mainly concerned with specifying what acts are 
required to levy war against the United States. In most cases, 
intent was inferred from the acts themselves. As a rule, in the 
early cases, the second prong of treason—adhering to the enemy— 
was not charged. 
Soon after the new federal government was established, it 
levied a tax on whiskey distilleries as part of a broader financial 
plan.101 Western Pennsylvania was the scene of opposition to the 
tax, and in 1794, the opposition became violent.102 Rallies fanned 
the flames of opposition, which spilled over into an attack on the 
home of John Neville, the tax collector, and resulted in his home 
being destroyed by fire.103 The federal government responded by 
calling for the muster of large militia forces, and even President 
Washington went to Carlisle to inspect them.104 Suspects were 
rounded up and taken to Philadelphia for trial.105 
Prosecutors sent thirty-five bills for treason to the grand jury, 
 
100. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 31 (1945). In his third 
installment of his article, Hurst maintains that treason requires a specific 
intent. Willard Hurst, Treason in the United States: Under the Constitution, 
58 HARV. L. REV. 806, 815 (1945). 
101. BRADLEY CHAPIN, Constitutional Definition, in THE AMERICAN LAW OF 
TREASON: REVOLUTIONARY AND EARLY NATIONAL ORIGINS 85–90 (Univ. of 
Wash. Press 1964). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 87. 
105. Id. 
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which, to the credit of their independence and good sense, 
endorsed eleven of them “ignoramus.”106 Of the remaining twenty-
four men who were indicted, thirteen had already fled.107 Philip 
Vigol108 and John Mitchell109 were tried and convicted. In both 
cases, the issue was essentially whether the acts complained of 
were a riot or an insurrection. The defense was that a charge of 
treason did not lie because the acts did not constitute treason. 
The court focused first on the object of the “insurrection.”110   
It held that because the object of the acts was “to suppress the 
excise offices, and to prevent the execution of an act of Congress, 
by force and intimidation” it was High Treason, “an usurpation of 
the authority of government . . . by levying war.”111 The Court 
then reviewed the evidence and found that the participants were 
“arrayed in a military manner; they affected the military forms of 
negotiation by a flag” and they demanded that John Neville 
surrender his commission.112 On the basis of these facts “the 
object of the insurrection was of a general and public nature.”113 
With a lack of thoroughness and subtlety in its analysis, the 
Court stated that the treasonous intent could be inferred from the 
purpose of the “insurrection” as well as the overt acts 
committed.114 Despite the flagrance of the acts and the burning of 
John Neville’s house, there was no evidence of an intent to betray 
the United States.115 Nevertheless, the Court found the requisite 
intent in the acts of Mitchell and Vigol which converted those acts 
from mere riot to treason.116 The defense correctly argued, but to 
no avail, that the charge was a constructive treason, which was 
well known in English law, but specifically excluded from the 
constitutional definition of treason.117 President Washington 
 
 
106. CHAPIN, supra note 101, at 87. “Ignoramus” meaning “we do not 
know.” The jury found the evidence insufficient for a true bill. 
107. Id. 
108. See United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346 (1795). 
109. See United States v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. 348 (1795). 
110. Id. at 348–49. 
111. Id. at 355. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346, 346–47 (1795). 
115. Mitchell, 2 U.S. at 352–53. 
116. Id. at 349–50; Vigol, 2 U.S. at 346–47. 
117. Mitchell, 2 U.S. at 350; Vigol, 2 U.S. at 347. 
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pardoned both Mitchell and Vigol as well as the other men who 
had been indicted. 
In 1798 there was another vigorous, if not particularly  
violent, protest against a federal excise tax.118 This time it was in 
eastern Pennsylvania.119 Great trouble arose after the U.S. 
Marshal arrested several men who had resisted paying the tax.120 
He sequestered his prisoners in a tavern in Bethlehem for 
safekeeping.121 A federal posse then surrounded the tavern to 
prevent their rescue by John Fries, the leader of a motley group of 
armed men bent on releasing the arrested men by any means 
possible.122 After a brief standoff, the U.S. Marshal agreed to 
release his prisoners on their promise to surrender to federal 
authorities in Philadelphia.123 Fries and his men had succeeded. 
No shots had been fired and no one had even been injured, let 
alone killed.124 
Despite the lack of overt violence—although it was certainly a 
possibility, which thankfully was averted—Fries was tried for 
treason in 1799 on the grounds that he had levied war against the 
United States by leading an armed band of men in military array 
against the marshal, specifically to prevent the collection of the 
excise tax imposed pursuant to an act of Congress. In this sense, 
his acts were similar to those of Mitchell and Vigol a few years 
before in the Whiskey Rebellion. 
Fries was tried twice. His first trial resulted in his conviction, 
but his motion for a new trial was granted on grounds of the 
possible bias of a juror.125 In April 1800, Fries was convicted a 
 
118. CHAPIN, supra note 101, at 90. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 91. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 92. 
124. Id. at 92; United States v. Fries, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 515 (1799); see 
generally W.W.H. DAVIS, THE FRIES REBELLION 1798–99 (Doylestown Pub. Co. 
1899). 
125. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the second Fries trial was the 
withdrawal of defense counsel. In the first trial, the defense had argued that 
armed opposition to enforcement of federal laws was not treason. Before the 
second trial started, Justice Samuel Chase, sitting as a Circuit judge, 
distributed to defense counsel and others his conclusion in writing that such 
opposition was treason, ostensibly in order to shorten the length of the trial. 
At that time, juries were allowed to make findings of law. Thus, Chase not 
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second time and was sentenced to hang. The matter did not end 
there. It had become embroiled in the political struggle between 
the Federalist administration of John Adams and Jefferson’s 
Republicans who opposed the excise tax and leapt to the defense of 
the man who had acted against its collection. 
President Adams’ cabinet was delighted with the verdict and 
the sentence. They thought it necessary to show the Jeffersonian 
Republicans that they could not foment disruption of national 
laws with impunity. They strongly advised Adams to deny Fries’ 
petition for pardon. A horrible example was a public necessity, 
they maintained.126 Adams gave deep and thorough consideration 
to the pardon and to the opinions of his cabinet, but after much 
thought, he disregarded partisan politics and pardoned Fries just 
as Washington had pardoned the participants in the Whiskey 
Rebellion.127 
In both the Fries case and the Whiskey Rebellion cases, a 
charge of treason was used to defend the authority of the federal 
government in a matter that was exclusively internal. No foreign 
power was involved and it was never even suggested that the 
defendants had betrayed the United States in favor of its enemies 
either by levying war or by adhering to them by giving them aid 
and comfort. At the most, all that the defendants had done was 
take up arms against a hated act of Congress. While their acts 
may have technically amounted to treason, the threat to the 
country was limited and local. Treason charges may have been 
appropriate, but the leaders’ convictions stressed the point that 
acts of Congress had to be obeyed.  Both Washington and Adams 
 
 
only deprived the defense of its major argument, he also invaded the province 
of the jury. After defense counsel had withdrawn, no successor defense 
counsel was appointed. Chase stated he would protect the rights of the 
defendant. Chase’s unusual act was a godsend to Jefferson and the 
Republicans in their attempt to cleanse the federal bench of Federalist 
judges. It was one of the reasons Chase was impeached, but not removed  
from the bench. He has the dubious distinction of being the only Supreme 
Court Justice ever to be impeached. CHAPIN, supra note 101, at 93–95. See 
LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 420–38 (Macmillan Pub. Co., 
Inc. 1974), for a concise and informative account of the impeachment trial of 
Justice Chase. 
126. CHAPIN, supra note 101, at 96; see also PAGE SMITH, JOHN ADAMS, 
1784–1826, at 1007 (Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1962). 
127. SMITH, supra note 126, at 1033–34. 
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rose above domestic politics and wisely concluded that conciliation 
was more important than hanging the defendants. 
Not all incidents involving armed resistance to the 
enforcement of national law rise to the level of levying war against 
the United States in the constitutional sense. In 1808, Frederick 
Hoxie was hired to deliver a raft loaded with timber on Lake 
Champlain from Vermont into Canada. He would be paid $800 
only upon a successful completion of his mission, but the federal 
embargo laws prohibited the transaction. These laws were key to 
the Jefferson administration’s policy to keep the United States out 
of the European war then raging. A federal official in Vermont 
attempted to enforce the embargo laws, which were detested in 
New England as much as the excise taxes had been detested in 
Pennsylvania. He seized the raft at Isle La Motte near the 
Canadian border. A United States trooper guarded the raft after 
its seizure until Hoxie, with about sixty men armed with muskets 
and clubs, forcibly re-took it and moved it northwards towards 
Canada. About an hour later, federal troops opened fire on the 
raft. Hoxie and the men on the raft returned the fire. Although  
the firing was in earnest on both sides, no one was even injured, 
let alone killed.128 The Jefferson administration was anxious for 
policy reasons to enforce the embargo laws by all means possible. 
They charged Hoxie with treason and brought him to trial. The 
court all but directed a verdict of acquittal.129 The court based its 
conclusion on the sometimes narrow distinction between 
insurrection and riot.130 After examining the facts of the case, the 
court looked at the object or purpose of the affray and found that it 
was of a local or private nature, not having a direct tendency to 
destroy all property and all government.131 Moreover, in order to 
be considered treason, the intention must be “universal or general, 
as to effect some object of a general, public nature” and that 
necessary intention was lacking.132 
What was the difference between Frederick Hoxie’s efforts to 
deliver a raft of timber to Canada in violation of federal law, 
which included a shootout with federal forces, John Fries’ acts, 
 
128. United States v. Hoxie, 26 F. Cas. 397 (C.C.D. Vt. 1808) (No. 15,407). 
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which involved assembling forces but no shootout, and John 
Mitchell’s and Philip Vigol’s armed resistance to the excise laws? 
The most obvious difference was in scope and intent: Hoxie sought 
only to deliver the timber to Canada so he could be paid for it 
despite the embargo, while the others resorted to violence or the 
threat of it to prevent the execution of lawful acts of Congress 
throughout the country. The court in Hoxie seized upon this 
distinction and found that the controversy was a private one, that 
Hoxie did not intend to force rescission of the embargo.133 
Therefore, Hoxie lacked treasonous intent, despite the exchange of 
serious musket fire with federal troops.134 The lack of the 
requisite treasonous intent prevented an armed conflict from 
being transformed from a riot or an affray into an act of treason by 
levying war. The intent, not the act, limited the scope of the 
crime.135 
The acquittal of Hoxie was undoubtedly the right decision.  
He was simply pursuing his own private interests in violation of 
the embargo laws. He lacked treasonous intent. The same cannot 
be said for Fries and the participants in the Whiskey Rebellion. 
Their intent was a “universal intent” to “resist or impede the 
operation” of the tax laws as enacted by Congress, which was a 
form of betrayal.136 These cases raise the troubling point that the 
treason statute of 1790137 was used to enforce acts of Congress in 
the Whiskey Rebellion and against John Fries. Hoxie was tried  
for treason to make a political point about enforcing the embargo. 
Since that time, Congress has enacted statutes more appropriate 
to the enforcement of federal authority, thus reserving treason 
prosecutions for cases involving betrayal of the United States.138 
Forceful opposition in Pennsylvania to lawfully imposed 
excise taxes prepared the way for the first two major treason cases 
under the Constitution.139 These cases articulated in American 
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jurisprudence the basic principles of treason by levying war. For 
this reason, they merit close examination. These cases arose from 
the complex web that Aaron Burr created in 1805 and 1806 and, 
like the Pennsylvania cases, involved allegations of levying war 
against the United States.140 Burr became involved in mysterious 
plots and inchoate plans, possibly to detach the region west of the 
Appalachian Mountains from the eastern United States.141 
Samuel Swartwout and Erick Bollman were connected in 
some way with the Burr plots. They were arrested in New 
Orleans, at the time recently purchased by the United States from 
France, and sent to Washington to stand trial for treason. The 
Supreme Court heard their ex parte motions for habeas corpus 
and then discharged the prisoners on the grounds that the facts of 
the case would not support a charge of treason.142 
The main issue was whether the indictment charged treason. 
In order to constitute the crime for which Swartwout and Bollman 
were accused, Chief Justice John Marshall held that there must 
have been an actual levying of war against the United States. He 
distinguished between conspiracy to levy war and the actual 
levying of war as two distinct offenses, and noted that a 
conspiracy did not rise to the level of treason.143 Marshall 
emphasized that “there must be an actual assemblage of men for 
the purpose of executing a treasonable design.”144 
Drawing on the court’s decision in Fries, Marshall concluded 
that “if they proceed to carry such intention into execution by 
force, . . . they are guilty of the treason of levying war; and the 
quantum of the force employed neither lessens nor increases the 
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crime.”145 In other words, levying war means an assembly of men 
for a treasonous purpose with the intent to achieve their goal by 
force. It is still considered treason even if the intended force is not 
used, or if it is insufficient to achieve its purpose. All that is 
required is that the assembly intends to use some amount of force 
and have it at their disposal. 
Marshall continued with a celebrated statement, which later 
gave him difficulty in the trial of Aaron Burr: 
[I]f war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be 
actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a 
treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, 
however minute, or however remote from the scene of 
action, and who are actually leagued in the general 
conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors.146 
Regardless of this dictum, Marshall’s analysis is consistent 
with the criteria Wilson set forth in his law lecture.147 Marshall’s 
rule follows the strict definition in the Constitution and is 
“determinate” in that it limits treason by levying war to (1) an 
assemblage of men, (2) who use force, regardless of its quantum 
for (3) a treasonous purpose.148 Marshall’s dictum explaining that 
remoteness from the scene of action is not a defense so long as 
there is a link between the accused and the “general conspiracy” 
appears to cover the situation in which a defendant with the 
requisite intent assembles with the main body but does not 
actually participate in the use of force.149 But this fact pattern  
was not before the Court in Bollman.150 
In examining the evidence against Swartwout and Bollman, 
the Court held that “[t]he mere enlisting of men, without 
assembling them, is not levying war” and “[t]he travelling of 
individuals to the place of rendezvous . . . would be an equivocal 
act, and has no warlike appearance.”151 However, “[t]he meeting 
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of particular bodies of men, and their marching from places of 
partial to a place of general rendezvous, would be such an 
assemblage.”152 Such was not the case with these defendants and, 
because no treasonous acts were alleged, the Court discharged 
Swartwout and Bollman.153 
This ruling clearly distinguished between conspiracy and 
plotting, neither of which amounts to treason, and acts of an 
assemblage of men in furtherance of the conspiracy or plot, which, 
no matter how great or slight, do amount to treason. The 
allegations must be fact specific. Using the Constitutional 
definition of treason against the United States, which states that 
treason “shall consist only in levying War against them, or in 
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort,”154 
limits judges from expanding it by construction. 
A few months later, Aaron Burr himself was brought to trial 
on charges of treason. It is no exaggeration to say that this was 
the trial of the nineteenth century.155 The political passions of the 
time were extraordinary. Thomas Jefferson, as president, brought 
the full weight of the federal government against his former vice- 
president.156 Not only was Jefferson bent on destroying Burr, but 
he and his party also sought to control the judicial branch as well 
as Congress.157 His political aims brought him into conflict with 
Chief Justice John Marshall, who favored an independent 
judiciary and a strong central government.158 Chief Justice 
Marshall sat as a trial judge at Burr’s trial in the Circuit Court for 
Virginia, which followed the common procedure at that time in 
which Supreme Court justices sat as Circuit Court judges.159 
Counsel on both sides were distinguished, extraordinarily 
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competent lawyers who presented thorough, exhaustive, and 
sometimes brilliant arguments.160 No trial has ever been more 
politically charged or produced more rancor between the parties 
and widespread, outright popular hatred of the defendant. 
The fundamental question of law raised by this trial was what 
constituted levying war under the Constitution.161 Both sides 
agreed that a treasonous intent was necessary. However, the 
argument concerned the extent of the overt act.162 The defense 
urged that levying war required an actual assemblage of men with 
the paraphernalia of war.163 The Government argued that arms 
and the application of force were not necessary so long as the 
assembled men had a treasonous intent.164 Other important legal 
questions were raised, argued at length, and ruled upon. These 
legal questions included executive privilege when the defense 
subpoenaed Jefferson’s papers, whether the common law applied 
in federal courts, and the extent of the guilt of an aider, abettor or 
procurer of treason.165 
Marshall instructed the jury that levying war required the 
use of force or the capability and readiness to use it. He said, 
War is an appeal from reason to the sword; and he who 
makes the appeal evidences the fact by the use of the 
means. His intention to go to war may be proved by 
words; but the actual going to war is a fact which is to be 
proved by open deed. The end is to be effected by force; 
and it would seem that in cases where no declaration is to 
be made, the state of actual war could be created by the 
employment of force, or being in a condition to employ 
it.166 
The underlying concept is that a resort to arms indicates that 
peaceable means have been discarded in favor of force. Here, 
Marshall followed the conclusion of the Whiskey Rebellion cases in 
which Mitchell and Vigol actually participated in the use of force, 
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burning John Neville’s house to obtain their goals.167 Although 
one might argue that Fries did not use force to obtain the release 
of his prisoners, the fact that his men were assembled and arrayed 
in a military manner and threatened to use it was consistent with 
Marshall’s later analysis.168 
In all of these cases the defendants had the requisite 
treasonous intent: Mitchell, Vigol, and Fries sought to prevent the 
collection of excise taxes and the enforcement of lawful acts of 
Congress and they were present at the commission of the overt 
acts: the burning of John Neville’s house and surrounding the 
tavern, respectively. Burr may well have sought to detach much  
of the trans-Appalachian country from the eastern United States, 
and thus, had the requisite treasonous intent, based on betrayal. 
However, unlike the earlier cases, the government in Burr’s case 
admitted Burr was not actually present at the time of the overt 
act.169 The result was a procedural victory for the defense, which 
soon led to Burr’s acquittal, despite the jury’s expressed 
inclination to convict.170 
Marshall had identified the elements of levying war. A 
generation later in 1842, when Rhode Island was faced with two 
governments and an actual civil war, Justice Joseph Story, sitting 
as a circuit judge in Rhode Island, elaborated upon, but did not 
change, Marshall’s elements in a charge to federal grand jury.171 
He identified five separate elements of levying war: (1) an 
assembly of persons, (2) met for a treasonous purpose (a general 
intent), (3) an overt act with forces to execute or towards  
executing a treasonous purpose, (4) a present intent to proceed in 
the execution of the treasonous purpose by force (a specific 
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intent).172 He added a fifth element, which was logically implied  
in his definition: (5) the capability of the assembly to use that 
force.173 
Two later Civil War cases followed in the same vein. In 
January 1861, an artillery company in Georgia took possession of 
Fort Pulaski from the United States “without encountering any 
forcible resistance.”174 A member of that company was later 
apprehended in Philadelphia and tried for treason.175 Following 
Marshall’s holding in United States v. Burr,176 the court defined 
the overt act in levying war as: (1) a body of armed men, (2) 
mustered in military array, (3) for a treasonous purpose. This 
definition is consistent with recognized legal authority.177 
In another case, the defendants obtained letters of marque 
from Confederate President Jefferson Davis.178 They outfitted a 
ship in San Francisco for the express purpose of preying on United 
States shipping in the Pacific, specifically on the route from 
Panama to California.179 As they were leaving the pier in San 
Francisco harbor, federal agents surrounded the ship and arrested 
the defendants.180 In charging the jury on the meaning of levying 
war, Justice Field, sitting as a circuit judge, pointed out that 
levying war requires: (1) “an assemblage of persons in force, [(2)] 
to overthrow the government, or to coerce its conduct.”181 The 
overt act of levying war can be either an act by which “war is 
brought into existence” or an act by which “war is prosecuted.”182 
The act of outfitting the ship with an intention to use it against 
United States shipping was sufficient to support a conviction for 
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treason, even though no force had been used against the United 
States.183 
By the time of the American Civil War, the law of treason, as 
far as the elements required for levying war were concerned, had 
been settled and was generally consistent with the classic English 
writers.184 More importantly, it was consistent with the 
Constitutional requirements that it be “determinate” and “stable” 
as James Wilson had prescribed.185 
IV. TREASON IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY—THE SECOND PRONG 
The twentieth century saw the United States emerge as a 
large, complex, modern state. Gone were the days when men were 
tempted to take up arms against the enforcement of federal taxes 
or even odious legislation, such as the Fugitive Slave Law.186 The 
enemies of the United States were external: the German Empire 
in 1917 and the Japanese Empire in 1941, along with the German 
Reich of Adolf Hitler. Treason prosecutions no longer charged 
levying war against the United States. Instead, the leading World 
War II cases charged the second prong of the constitutional 
definition: adhering to its enemies by giving them aid and comfort, 
a more subtle form of betrayal than levying war. 
In 1943, the Supreme Court received its first ever appeal from 
a treason conviction.187 Anthony Cramer was born a German 
national and became a naturalized American citizen in the 
1930s.188 He was sympathetic to the aims of Germany, and he 
made no secret of his opposition to American entrance into the 
war against Germany,189 although Hitler gratuitously declared 
war against the United States a few days after the attack on Pearl 
Harbor in December 1941. In 1942, Cramer met twice publicly in 
New York restaurants with two German friends who had arrived 
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unannounced in New York.190 They had left the United States 
before war broke out and returned home to help Germany in the 
war effort.191 Later the German government sent them and  
others back to the United States by submarine to disrupt the 
American war effort.192 Cramer was arrested,  tried,  and 
convicted of treason on the grounds that he adhered to enemies of 
the United States by giving them aid and comfort.193 
The overt act, witnessed by two FBI agents, was nothing more 
than Cramer’s public meetings in restaurants with the 
saboteurs.194 There was no evidence as to what they discussed or 
whether any plans were made at these two meetings.195 The 
government did not even have any evidence from which an 
inference could be made as to what happened, other than eating 
and drinking together.196 The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit affirmed Cramer’s conviction.197 Upon review, the 
Supreme Court reversed in a 5–4 decision written by Justice 
Robert Jackson.198 
The two elements of treason are intent and an overt act in 
furtherance of that intent. Cramer’s adherence to Germany, the 
enemy, was a state of mind and, thus, it was not susceptible to 
direct proof. It could only be established by circumstantial 
evidence: Cramer’s sympathies towards Germany were 
tantamount to his adherence to the enemy.199 The overt act 
charged was meeting publicly with the two saboteurs in 
restaurants.200 
The issue on appeal was not whether Cramer had a 
treasonous intent, but whether his overt act of meeting twice with 
the two saboteurs rose to the level of providing them with aid and 
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comfort, so as to satisfy the constitutional definition of treason.201 
They were the only overt acts charged. Cramer either knew, or 
had reason to know, that the men he met with were enemies of the 
United States. The issue, then, concerned the function of  the 
overt act. Cramer urged that the overt act “alone and on its face 
must manifest a traitorous intention” while the Government 
contended that “an apparently commonplace and insignificant act 
and . . . other circumstances [may] create an inference that the act 
was a step in treason and was done with treasonable intent.”202 
The Supreme Court took the middle road between these two 
contentions and held that the minimum function of the overt act 
was to “show sufficient action by the accused . . . that [he] actually 
gave aid and comfort to the enemy.”203 Since there was no  
showing that these meetings conferred any benefit upon the two 
saboteurs, Cramer did not provide aid and comfort to them.204 As 
the Court said, “[m]eeting with Cramer in public drinking places 
to tipple and trifle was no part of the saboteurs’ mission and did 
not advance it.”205 This is the reason the Court reversed his 
conviction.206  It is noteworthy that the Court did not hold that  
the overt act must manifest a treasonous intent (although it could 
have), only that the overt act must in fact give actual aid and 
comfort to the enemy.207  The Court did not specify the quantum  
of aid and comfort. 
Cramer’s holding that the overt act must result in some aid 
and comfort to the enemy—promoting or furthering the enemy’s 
mission—is consistent with the constitutional definition of 
treason, which specifies that the overt act following adherence to 
the enemy must be accompanied by “giving aid and comfort.”208 
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The Constitution uses the word “giving,” which requires an actual 
rendition of aid and comfort, not an overt act that would likely or 
even could provide aid and comfort.209 
In this respect, Cramer’s requirement that treason “consist of 
something outward and visible and capable of direct proof” is 
consistent with the framers’ intent to protect free speech and 
political dissent.210 Justice Jackson made this point abundantly 
clear: “[a] citizen intellectually or emotionally may favor the 
enemy and harbor sympathies or convictions disloyal to this 
country’s policy or interest, but so long as he commits no act of aid 
and comfort to the enemy, there is no treason.”211 
Cramer is the law.212 Its holding was roundly criticized in a 
vigorous dissent by Justice Douglas on the grounds that it is a 
departure from the historic function of the overt act in treason 
cases.213 He pointed out that the purpose of the overt act 
requirement is “to preclude punishment for treasonable plans or 
schemes or hopes which have never moved out of the realm of 
thought or speech.”214 All that is necessary is that  the 
government “must . . . establish[] beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the act was part of the treasonable project and done  in 
furtherance of it.”215 Under this concept, Justice Douglas 
concluded that Cramer’s conviction should have been affirmed.216 
There have been other criticisms as well.217 A more modern 
critique has pointed out that Cramer did not foreclose future 
 
 
209. Id. 
210. 325 U.S. at 29. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 48 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
214. Id. at 61. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 67. 
217. The first and most telling criticism was by James Willard Hurst 
almost immediately after the decision was announced. See WILSON, supra 
note 34. Hurst was a young scholar on active duty with the Navy  
Department in Washington. He was loaned to the office of the Attorney 
General to prepare briefs for the re-argument. Hurst’s comments, insights, 
and criticism must be taken seriously, because they are the seminal work of 
the law of treason. However, the reader should also remember that Hurst 
wrote for the losing side in Cramer and it is understandable that he would 
not necessarily embrace a decision which reversed a major conviction. 
 36 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1 
 
prosecutions and convictions for treason.218 The Court simply 
made future prosecutions and convictions more difficult by 
requiring the government to show that actual aid and comfort 
were conferred on an enemy.219 By making a conviction more 
difficult, Cramer follows the intent of James Wilson and other 
drafters of the treason clause.220 As the dissent so aptly points 
out, they made no bones about making a treason conviction 
difficult for three good reasons: (1) “to preclude punishment for 
treasonable plans or schemes or hopes which have never moved 
out of the realm of thought and speech” thus removing treason as 
a means of repressing political dissent; (2) “to foreclose 
prosecutions for constructive treason” because the constitutional 
definition of treason is “determinate” and may not be expanded; 
and (3) to make sure that treason “is complete as a crime only 
when the traitorous intent has ripened into a physical and 
observable act.”221 These reasons were consistent with the 
historical function of the overt act.222 
Despite the assertions set forth by the Cramer dissent, as well 
as other critics,223 convictions were upheld on appeal in other 
major treason cases arising out of World War II. In these cases, 
treason was based on the defendant’s adherence to the enemy by 
giving aid and comfort.224 These cases focused on the element of 
intent, because the overt acts clearly satisfied the aid and comfort 
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element of treason. The defendants actually provided aid and 
comfort to the enemy. 
Max Stephan provided food, shelter, money, and other 
assistance to Hans Peter Krug, a Luftwaffe pilot, who had escaped 
from a prisoner of war camp in Canada and made his way to 
Detroit in 1942 after the United States and Germany went to 
war.225  The Sixth Circuit affirmed Stephan’s treason conviction  
in 1943.226 It was clear that Stephan had provided aid  and 
comfort to Krug. The essential element of treasonous intent was 
inferred from the facts of the case.227 
Cramer made clear that aid and comfort must actually be 
provided to an enemy to sustain a conviction for treason.228 But 
what about an otherwise innocent act, such as a father’s provision 
of shelter and other assistance to a son? Max Haupt found that a 
treasonous intent will transform an otherwise innocent act into 
treason.229 He provided shelter and other assistance to his son, 
known to him to be a saboteur and spy who returned to the United 
States from Germany by submarine.230 Haupt’s defense was that 
the aid and comfort he rendered to his son was not evidence of 
adhering to an enemy of the United States or even of a treasonous 
intent.231 Rather, it was only a father’s solicitude for his son and, 
thus, was an innocent act.232 The jury found otherwise, and the 
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.233 
A treasonous intent may be inferred “from the natural 
consequences [a speaker] knows will result from his acts.”234 A 
person may have a First Amendment right to criticize the 
president as he wishes, even intemperately, and to state that the 
United States cannot win a war, and also to urge voters to elect a 
new administration that will change policy.235 However, Douglas 
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Chandler went beyond the limits of his First Amendment rights 
when he trafficked with the enemy by taking a paid position in 
Nazi Germany’s propaganda organization and by making radio 
broadcasts for the enemy.236 In doing so, he went “outside the 
shelter of the First Amendment,” even though he may have 
sincerely believed that Nazi Germany was “the bulwark of 
Western Civilization against . . . the Jewish-Bolshevist 
menace.”237 The jury could, and did, infer a treasonous intent  
from the natural consequences of his propaganda broadcasts and 
convicted him of treason.238 
In 1952, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to rule again 
on the sufficiency of overt acts in light of its holding in Cramer.239 
Tomoya Kawakita was a dual national of both Japan and the 
United States.240 He was in Japan at the outbreak of war in 
December 1941 and remained there for the duration of the war.241 
After the war, he was charged with treason on grounds that he 
adhered to the enemy and rendered aid to Japan by his brutal 
treatment of American prisoners of war while he was guarding 
them.242 
The Court agreed with the jury verdict that each of 
Kawakita’s six overt acts of cruelty in fact gave aid and comfort to 
the enemy, because they promoted the cause of Japan, as “[t]hey 
were acts which tended to strengthen the enemy and advance its 
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interests.”243 The Court stressed the importance of the nature of 
the overt act, which presumably means the ultimate effect of 
conferring benefit on the enemy.244 The Court said, 
The act may be unnecessary to a successful completion of 
the enemy’s project; it may be an abortive attempt; it may 
in the sum total of the enemy’s effort be a casual and 
unimportant step. But if it gives aid and comfort to the 
enemy at the immediate moment of its performance, it 
qualifies as an overt act within the constitution of 
treason.245 
In this respect, the Court followed Marshall’s reasoning in Ex 
Parte Bollman, “[i]f war be actually levied . . . all those who 
perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the 
scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general 
conspiracy are to be considered as traitors.”246 
Because of the World War II cases, the second prong of the 
law of treason became well settled. The character of the overt act 
and not its success, or even its failure, is the proper focus of any 
inquiry: Did adherence to the enemy result in any aid and comfort 
to the enemy by advancing the enemy cause? If so, there would be 
betrayal and thus, treason. 
V. TREASON AND THE WAR AGAINST TERROR 
The Constitution specifies that treason consists of only two 
acts: levying war against the United States and adhering to its 
enemies by giving them aid and comfort.247 The first treason  
cases involved armed domestic rebellion against the federal 
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government.248 The most recent World War II cases involved a 
foreign enemy. Germany and Japan were easily discernable as 
enemies because war had been declared. However, in the twenty- 
first century, the enemy in the war against terror has not been a 
state and its forces are seldom armed and arrayed in a traditional 
military manner, all of which makes its identification as an enemy 
difficult. Whether the enemy is al-Qaeda or another group, the 
fact remains that the main “enemy” in the war against terror is 
not a state, although a state may succor and even encourage non- 
state actors in their endeavors. At home, the threats are covert 
and frequently the “enemy” can be identified only with difficulty 
before he strikes. 
These changed circumstances do not mean that treason is now 
an outmoded legal concept, or even that other statutes have 
superseded treason as the most appropriate legal weapon in the 
proper circumstances. At its root, treason is a crime  of 
betrayal.249 Thus, courts have stated, “[n]o crime is greater than 
treason.”250 The treason statute is not aimed at “any person,” 
rather it applies only to citizens who owe a duty of loyalty or 
allegiance to the state, and to non-citizens who enjoy its 
protection.251 In this way, it is reserved for the most egregious 
overt acts, which involve an intent to betray the United States.252 
Prosecutions for treason are a matter of self-preservation for a 
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state, that is, for the body politic to which the traitor belongs 
either permanently or temporarily.253 
An early, if not the first, attack against the United States in 
the war of terror was the 1993 bombing of the World Trade 
Center. The perpetrators of this attack were not charged with 
treason.254 However, they were tried and later convicted of 
seditious conspiracy.255 In holding that the defendants were 
convicted under the correct statute, the Second Circuit pointed out 
that the crime of treason is limited to “betrayals of allegiance that 
are substantial” and only to levying war and rendering aid and 
comfort to enemies.256 Whether some or all the defendants could 
have been charged with treason is moot.257 
The horrendous attacks of September 11, 2001, revealed to 
the American public that the United States was in fact involved in 
a new kind of war. However, even afterwards, some Americans 
sided with the enemy. Many Americans who supported the 
terrorists have been charged with various federal crimes, such as 
seditious conspiracy. Surprisingly, only one indictment  for 
treason against an American citizen, Adam Gadahn, has 
resulted.258 However, Gadahn might have been killed in 
Waziristan in 2008 after the indictment was returned and is still 
missing. Thus, he may never come to trial.259 The thrust of the 
indictment is that Gadahn was an American citizen who adhered 
to enemies of the United States by giving them aid and comfort.260 
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The specific acts charged were making various videos for al- 
Qaeda.261 In doing so, he breached his duty of allegiance to the 
United States, that is, the social contract.262 His indictment for 
treason in 2006 was the first since World  War II.263  If only for 
this reason, it is worth examining. 
The indictment opens with a statement that, pursuant to 
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Secretary 
of State has designated al-Qaeda as a foreign terrorist 
organization.264 Presumably, this designation is sufficient to 
qualify al-Qaeda as an “enemy” of the United States. The 
indictment continues by describing the September 11, 2001, 
attacks and the assertion by Osama bin Laden, as leader of al- 
Qaeda, that those attacks were an al-Qaeda operation.265 
The indictment then alleges that Gadahn is an American 
citizen whose last known residence was in Orange County, 
California and, importantly, that he owes allegiance to the United 
States as a citizen.266 The gravamen of the offense is that he 
adhered to al-Qaeda, “an enemy of the United States . . . with 
intent to betray the United States” by committing five overt acts, 
all of which were appearances in al-Qaeda propaganda videos.267 
Statements that he allegedly made are recited in the indictment, 
including:  “Fighting  and  defeating  America  is  our  first  
priority . . . .”; “So after  all  the  atrocities  committed  by  
America . . . why should we target their military only?”; and 
“Escape  from  the  unbelieving  side  and   join   the   winning  
side . . . .”268 Presumably, these videos were made outside the 
United States, probably in Afghanistan or Pakistan. 
Gadahn’s acts mirror those of Douglas Chandler, as Gadahn 
also went abroad, joined an enemy propaganda organization and 
made communications, which were later broadcast, and thus 
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advanced the cause of an enemy of the United States by giving 
them aid and comfort.269 Making propaganda broadcasts for an 
enemy meets the standard of Cramer, which held that the offense 
of treason requires that the defendant give actual aid and comfort 
to that enemy.270 Underlying these overt acts is Gadahn’s clear 
intent to betray the United States. Treason is the appropriate 
charge in his case. 
In order to support a charge of treason, the facts of each case 
must clearly and precisely fit into the definition of this crime. 
Adam Gadahn, along with others, had not only adhered to the 
enemy, but he has also trafficked with them, and in doing so, has 
given them aid and comfort.271 The facts as stated in Gadahn’s 
indictment fairly support a charge of treason.272 In other 
instances, the facts have ranged from ambiguous to inconclusive 
so far as a charge of treason is concerned. In those instances, 
unlike in Gadahn’s case, prosecution under statutes other than 
treason was clearly warranted. 
Gadahn might be tempted to use the First Amendment as a 
defense to these charges.273 He might claim that in making the 
videos he was merely exercising his right of free speech and that 
the treason statute infringes upon that right. This defense will be 
of no avail to him. The First Circuit in Chandler v. United 
States274 pointed out that Chandler trafficked with the Nazis by 
joining their propaganda organization and then making 
broadcasts for it. The court concluded, “[i]t is preposterous to talk 
about freedom of speech in this connection . . . .”275  It is difficult  
to imagine that a court would fail to follow Chandler. In addition, 
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both the treason clause and the First Amendment are 
constitutional provisions, and thus, both must be given effect 
unless the First Amendment repealed or modified the treason 
clause. That conclusion is indeed a long shot bordering on the 
preposterous. 
An examination of some of the more publicized prosecutions 
arising out of the war against terror shows a wide variety of 
methods, acts, and conspiracies to act. Some individuals acted 
alone; others acted in concert with groups of varying sizes. Some 
instances involved pre-emptive arrests, which curtailed the acts 
and subsequently prevented a ripening into treason while also 
preventing significant property damage and loss of life. All of 
these people shared a common antipathy to the United States, and 
an intent to betray the United States. But few, if any, of these  
acts rose to the level of treason. 
Bryant Neal Vinas went to Afghanistan specifically to join the 
Taliban so that he could fight the Americans.276 He admitted to 
participating in two raids on American military installations in 
which two rockets were fired; fortunately without effect.277 He 
joined an enemy military force, which was armed and arrayed in a 
military manner appropriate to the circumstances and 
intentionally engaged in a military operation against a United 
States military base.278 These acts amounted to levying war 
against the United States with the requisite intent to betray the 
United States.279 Thus, he could have been charged with treason, 
but he was not. Instead, he was charged with and pleaded guilty 
to conspiring to murder United States nationals, providing 
material support to al-Qaeda and receiving military training from 
al-Qaeda.280 However, he did provide American authorities with 
significant intelligence about an al Qaeda plot to blow up a Long 
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Island Railroad commuter train in Penn Station.281 His 
cooperation with authorities may partially explain why he was not 
charged with treason for his earlier participation with the 
Taliban, even though those acts were a significant act of betrayal 
of the United States. However, even if he may have participated  
in the al Qaeda plot in Penn Station, those acts alone do not rise 
to the level of treason. A mere plot or conspiracy is not  treason. 
An overt act is required. 
Michael Finton and Najibullah Zazi both attempted to wage 
war against the United States in furtherance of a terrorist cause. 
Both men had the requisite intent to betray the United States. 
However, both were arrested before their overt acts could ripen 
into treason. Finton is an American citizen who attempted to 
bomb the federal building in Springfield, Illinois.282 He pleaded 
guilty to charges of attempted murder and attempted use of a 
weapon of mass destruction.283 He is currently serving a twenty- 
eight-year term.284 Najibullah Zazi is a Pashtun citizen of 
Afghanistan, but he is also a legal resident of the United 
States.285 He was accused of planning a suicide bombing of the 
New York subway, and has pleaded guilty to charges of conspiring 
to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to commit murder 
in a foreign country, and providing material support to a terrorist 
organization.286 
The case of Colleen LaRose, also known as “Jihad Jane,” is 
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different.287 She is an American citizen who has encouraged 
enlistment in al-Qaeda, a foreign terrorist organization.288 
Clearly, the first prong of treason is satisfied, as she has adhered 
to the enemy, al-Qaeda. However, it remains to be seen whether 
her recruiting has produced recruits, and thus, has given aid and 
comfort the enemy. For this reason, prosecutors could examine  
her case closely to determine whether she should be charged with 
treason. Yet, they will not do so, because she has already been 
charged with conspiracy to murder Lars Vilks, a Swedish artist 
who drew a cartoon with the head of Mohammed on a dog, as well 
as a charge of providing material support to terrorists.289 She  
pled guilty to the conspiracy to commit murder charge on 
February 1, 2011, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.290 At the time of her pleading, there 
were indications that she intended to change her “not guilty plea” 
of providing material support to terrorists, to “guilty.”291 
John Walker Lindh, born 1981, was one of the first to face the 
combined wrath of the American people and the determination of 
the federal government to prosecute someone in the wake of the 
attacks of September 11, 2001.292 As a teenager in Marin County, 
California, he converted to Islam, and before he was eighteen, he 
had traveled to Yemen to study Arabic.293 He then went to 
Afghanistan, where he attended an al-Qaeda training camp, and 
later joined the Taliban.294 He participated in the Taliban’s 
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campaign against the Northern Alliance in 2001.295  He  was 
aware of the attacks of September 11, but remained with the 
Taliban nevertheless.296 He was ultimately captured by forces of 
the Northern Alliance, and was in captivity when representatives 
of the United States Government interrogated him and other 
captives.297 The Taliban captives rioted and killed an American 
interrogator, Johnny Michael Spann.298 
It is not clear when Lindh identified himself to his American 
captors as an American citizen. However, early in his 
interrogation, he requested to see a lawyer, but none were 
available in the field, or even later when he was in military 
custody.299 What is clear is that his treatment while in American 
custody was rough, and possibly even inhumane; it is a surprise 
that he survived this ordeal.300 He was photographed blindfolded 
and bound naked in a container.301 This iconic photograph  
became a representation of the fate of a young man who had left 
his country to fight for the enemy, but not necessarily against the 
United States. Even so, Lindh received extraordinary public 
opprobrium and antipathy as a traitor.302 
Lindh was not indicted for treason. Rather, of the ten counts 
in his indictment half were for conspiracy and only two were for 
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actual acts: supplying services to the Taliban and using and 
carrying firearms during crimes of violence.303 After lengthy 
negotiations, he pleaded guilty to the two acts as charged and the 
remaining eight conspiracy charges were dismissed.304 He was 
sentenced to twenty years’ confinement. 
Did Lindh commit treason as many have claimed? Probably 
not, because treason is strictly defined and reserved for the 
extreme cases where “betrayals of allegiance [] are substantial.”305 
The evidence of the overt acts at best is ambiguous.  Lindh did 
levy war against the Northern Alliance, but there is no clear 
evidence that he levied war against the United States. The 
interesting question remains as to whether the services he 
supplied to the Taliban amounted to aid and comfort under the 
constitutional definition of treason. 
At the heart of the matter, the question of his intent remains. 
Without the requisite intent to betray the United States, Lindh’s 
acts do not rise to the level of treason. Clearly, he adhered to the 
Taliban by attending their training camp, and participating in the 
campaign against the Northern Alliance. However, it remains to 
be seen whether a reasonable jury could find that by doing so he 
intended to betray the United States, especially in the face of his 
assertion that he was following his Islamic faith. Indeed, Lindh 
could have asserted the defense of duress; he could have claimed a 
policy of both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance to use 
coercive tools to enforce “loyalty” on their respective sides.  
Duress, then, would negate the requisite intent to betray the 
United States. 
So far none of these cases, with the notable exception of Adam 
Gadahn, merit a charge of treason. However, a treason charge is 
still a viable option under the proper circumstances. For example, 
consider these plausible but hypothetical facts: A group of ten 
young men, all born in the United States and educated in local 
schools, received military training from a terrorist group or 
organization abroad in the use of weapons, and in the conception 
and execution of military operations to wreak havoc in the United 
 
303. Lindh Indictment, supra note 296. 
304. Tom Jackman, In Deal, Lindh Pleads Guilty to Aiding Taliban, 
WASH. POST, July 16, 2002, at A1. 
305. United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 114 (2d Cir. 1999) (alteration 
in original). 
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States for the purpose of bringing down the government. In 
furtherance of this goal, they conceived a scheme and plotted to 
attack a major military base during its outdoor ceremonies while 
the Secretary of Defense is speaking. The purpose of this attack 
was to make war on the United States. They acquired the 
appropriate weapons and the means to deliver the payloads of 
these weapons. Their leader had even served as a junior officer in 
the United States Armed Forces. Moments before they were to 
make the attack, the FBI arrested them. No shots were fired. 
These facts support a charge of treason by levying war against 
the United States. The men were assembled and arrayed in a 
military manner, and they were about to make an attack. These 
men levied war against the United States. John Marshall 
described the overt act of levying war in the Burr trial in 1807: 
“[W]ar might be levied without a battle, or the actual application 
of force to the object on which it was designed to act; that a body of 
men assembled for the purpose of war, and being in a posture of 
war, do levy war . . . .”306 These ten men in the above hypothetical 
were assembled and arrayed in a military manner to conduct an 
attack on a United States military base. This would be enough to 
make it an overt act of treason. Because treasonous intent may be 
inferred from the act itself, the fact that the attack was frustrated 
only by their arrest, before any weapons were fired, is of no 
moment. 
The Constitution requires two witnesses to the same overt 
act, which in this case should not be difficult.307 However, 
treasonous intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence. 
Indeed, in these circumstances the overt act is “evidence of the 
treasonable purpose and intent” of its perpetrators.308 These ten 
men in the above hypothetical were in the process of executing 
their plan, and had the capability of executing it. The matter had 
left the realm of conspiracy and entered the realm of action. 
Moreover, these men had received appropriate training by a 
terrorist group specifically for the purpose of making an attack 
against the United States. In addition, the FBI could have other 
 
306. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 201, 203 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 
14,694) (alteration in original). 
307. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
308. United States v. Cramer, 325 U.S. 1, 32 (1945). 
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evidence of intent, not only from witnesses, but from legitimate 
wiretaps or computer based sources. Based on these facts, a 
reasonable jury could find that the ten men had the requisite 
treasonous intent. Their overt act became treason under the 
Constitution when it was accompanied by this intent. 
While there is little, if any, dispute over what the acts were, 
the intent of these men still should be scrutinized carefully. At  
the very least they intended to destroy property which they knew 
would result in numerous deaths. However, their ultimate 
purpose was to bring down the United States government. So long 
as the government can produce evidence upon which a reasonable 
jury could find their intent was to levy war against the United 
States, and not just to murder unnamed individuals and destroy 
government property, then the jury could return a finding of  
guilty on a treason charge.309 Levying war against the United 
States is treason because, at root, it is an attack on the body 
politic and a breach of the underlying social contract. Thus, the 
attack as planned was essentially an attack on all Americans, 
even if it was ultimately unsuccessful. 
These men would probably assert lack of treasonous intent as 
a defense. However, their leader would be able to assert a novel 
defense. As an officer of the armed forces, he took an oath to 
support and defend the Constitution. He could assert the defense 
used by Jefferson Davis in 1868 to quash his indictment for 
treason. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution came 
into effect in early 1868. Davis claimed that the disability from 
holding public office in section 3 of that Amendment constituted 
punishment and thus the Constitution prohibited a subsequent 
prosecution for treason.310 The motion to quash was heard in the 
 
309. In addition, a jury could also return a verdict of guilty on lesser 
charges, such as conspiracy to murder government officials, under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1117 or an attempted offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2332b, “Acts of Terrorism 
Transcending National Boundaries.” 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1117, 2332b (Westlaw 
through Pub. L. No. 115-51). 
310. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or 
elector of President or Vice President, or hold any office, civil or 
military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having 
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer 
of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as 
an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the 
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Circuit Court for Virginia, which failed to rule on it. Instead, the 
matter was sent to the Supreme Court. However, in December 
1868, President Johnson issued a blanket pardon, which included 
Jefferson Davis, thus making the motion to quash moot. However, 
one question is still unanswered: whether the disability clause is a 
punishment for persons who have taken an oath to support the 
Constitution but later engage in rebellion or insurrection—that is, 
levying war—and thus precludes a prosecution for the crime of 
treason.311 
The facts of this hypothetical meet the strict Constitutional 
requirements for a charge of treason. The overt act of preparing  
an attack on a United States military installation and the ability 
to launch it when coupled with the requisite treasonous intent, 
which may be inferred from the overt act itself, present a clear 
and convincing case of treason by levying war against the United 
States. A charge of treason is appropriate and it may be coupled 
with other lesser offenses. 
CONCLUSION 
An act of treason is a betrayal of the political body, because it 
is a deliberate, intentional breach of the social contract. John 
Marshall correctly observed that treason is “the most atrocious 
offense which can be committed against the political body”312 and 
 
 
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection 
or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3. 
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that “there is no crime which can more excite and agitate the 
passions of men than treason.”313 Recorded history is replete with 
examples of how the betrayal implicit in treason strikes at the 
very heart of society. Consider the fate of Eretria, a small Greek 
city on the island of Euboea, under siege by the Persian king 
Xerxes. Only two citizens of Eretria opened the gates to the 
Persians, who sacked and burned the city and then enslaved the 
inhabitants.314 Because everyone is a victim, treason should be 
charged only for the most atrocious, the most serious, and the 
most heinous offenses. 
American history is similarly replete with examples of the 
extraordinary passions that even a perception of betrayal can 
ignite, regardless of whether formal charges were preferred. 
Notable examples are former vice-president Aaron Burr in 1807, 
and in modern times, the actress Jane Fonda in 1970, and John 
Walker Lindh in 2001. Burr was tried and acquitted.315  Fonda 
was not even charged, and Lindh pleaded guilty to lesser 
offenses.316 All three were widely believed to have betrayed the 
United States. The acts of all three excited and agitated public 
passions. 
Congress has enacted extensive legislation covering a wide 
variety of lesser, but still very serious, offenses that might 
otherwise be considered treasonous and has made it applicable to 
both citizens and residents of the United  States.317  These 
statutes have been invoked in numerous instances in the war 
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against terror, and convictions have resulted. Nevertheless, the 
constitutionally defined crime of treason remains available to 
prosecute the most egregious offenses. 
The modern state representing contemporary society not only 
has the right, but also the duty to enforce the loyalty of its 
members and those who enjoy its protection. Treason is a crime of 
betrayal, because it is a threat to the security of all members of 
society. Society has determined that traitors should be punished. 
However, the Constitution limits the acts that constitute treason, 
and then it provides important procedural safeguards first by 
requiring two witnesses to the same overt act and then by 
excluding out of court confessions. In this way, the Constitution 
adequately protects both the interests of the state to punish 
betrayal and the rights of the accused. Treason is still a  valid 
legal tool and it should be used. 
